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RESEARCH FOR LEGISLATION.*
CHARLES

B. NUTTING t
I.

INTRODUCTION.

"RESEARCH

FOR LEGISLATION" is a formidable subject
since itincludes a wide variety of possible topics. To cover
them all adequately would be impossible within any reasonable limitation of space. However, in order to provoke criticism and comment,
a somewhat superficial treatment of a number of these matters seems
more desirable than a more profound consideration of only a few.
By way of introduction a few things not suggested by the subject
might be mentioned. Anyone who discusses legislation in a favorable
way is apt to be suspect because of the traditional'abhorrence of legislation on the part of the common lawyer. I think this is due largely
to the influence of nineteenth century juridical thought on many of
the lawyers who are still practicing, and who have trained many of
those who are entering the practice today. These persons, largely
influenced by the historical school, took an extremely dim view of the
efficacy of legislation in solving human problems. As an example,
James C. Carter, the eminent Boston lawyer, in one of his lectures on
Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function,' has this to say:
"The popular estimate of the possibilities for good which may
be realized through the enactment of law is, in my opinion, greatly
exaggerated. Nothing is more attractive to the benevolent vanity
of men than the notion that they can effect great improvements in
society by the simple process of forbidding all wrong conduct, or
conduct which they think is wrong, by law, and of enjoining all
good conduct by the same means, as if men could not find out how
to live unless a book were placed in the hands of every individual
in which the things to be done and those not to be done were clearly
set down."
* The text of this article was originally delivered at a conference on Aims and
Methods of Legal Research, held at the University of Michigan Law Quadrangle,
Ann Arbor, on November 4 and 5, 1955. This article will be printed together with
comment upon it, and with other papers read at the same conference, in the full proceedings published by the University of Michigan.
t"Director, The Buhl Foundation. Former Vice Chancellor and Professor of
Law, University of Pittsburgh; A.B. 1927, J.D. 1930, State University of Iowa;
LL.M. 1932, S.J.D. 1933, Harvard University. Member of the Iowa and Kansas Bars.
1. Lecture IX, p. 221 (1907).
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Carter goes on to say that the person who has done most to cuLtivate this point of view is Jeremy Bentham, and points out that his
theories provoked ".

.

.

the rather coarse but expressive sarcasm of

Carlysle, who as you know, did not revel in pictures of human happiness
or greatly love the common herd, that it was a scheme 'for the distribution of an attainable amount of Pig-wash among a given multitude of
Pigs.' " He goes on to say, "I do not adopt this characterization of
the work of a great and philanthropic man."
However, in outlining what he regards as the province of legislation, Carter makes a good deal more sense than the extract just quoted
would lead one to believe. He suggests, first
"[T]hat it is an instrumentality first employed at a somewhat
advanced stage of social progress and after society has come to
assume an organized form;" second "[T]hat the purposes for
which it was at first and still is employed were political rather
than juristic, to remove political evils, perfect the organization of
the state, and thus to aid the unwritten law of custom and make
it more effective, rather than to attempt to furnish a substitute for
it; that its action, therefore, was confined to the province of Public
Law;" third "[T]hat the only considerable exception to this was
the instance of codification, an exception more apparent than real,
the cases in which it was resorted to being mainly where several
states or provinces having different customs have become united
under one government and the different customs were confused and
needed unification."
With much of this I would agree, although of course one can now
take exception to his point of view that legislation cannot affect the
relationships between individuals. However, there is a good deal of
common sense in what he says. Theoretically, of course, almost every
problem involving human conduct can be regarded as within the province of legislation. But for practical purposes, the following categories
may be useful in marking the boundaries of the field.
II.
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES.

First, legislation is useful to provide a framework for governmental action in new fields which were not considered by the common
law to be within the province of governmental action. Examples are
readily apparent. The whole program of social security is an instance.
Laws relating to the control of atomic energy and laws dealing with
the conservation of natural resources on a broad plane are other instances in which the common law had nothing to say, but where now
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we feel that there must be some sort of legal control. Obviously, legislation is the solution of this situation.
Another example of legitimate legislative activity is where it is
necessary to cope with situations which the common law could not
handle. The most obvious example of this type has to do with workmen's compensation. We are familiar with the fact that the old law
of master and servant which was adopted in England prior to the industrial revolution did not effectively answer the problems which were
raised when mass production became common and where thousands of
workers were employed by the same corporation, frequently without
ever coming in contact or knowing each other. In this setting, the
common law rule of assumption of risk and the fellow servant doctrine
obviously made no sense. The result was that workmen's compensation
legislation, which removed the basic principle of no liability without
fault, and which abolished the doctrines to which I have referred came
into being. And now practically all industrial accidents are covered
by this type of legislation.
Along the same line, the enactment of legislation dealing with
unfair labor practices, both by employers and employes, was made necessary because the common law had not developed an effective way to
handle matters of this kind.
Possibly we may be witnessing yet another instance, although in
the United States at least we do not have as yet very much legislation
dealing with the problem. Personal injury litigation has become so
prevalent and the consequences of verdicts have become so irrational
that it may be we shall have to follow the lead of -some of the Continental countries and some of the Canadian Provinces in providing for
the statutory treatment of personal injury cases in a manner analogous
to that which was employed in connection with workmen's compensation. These are only a few of the situations which have existed in:
the past and which may arise in the future, which may result in-the
necessity for statutory treatment rather than reliance on the common
law.
Finally, legislation is important and useful in connection with
attempts to codify and to revise a body of existing statutory law. The
term "codification" is used broadly because it should mean more than
simply a compilation of existing statutes. It may well include a revision of statutes in the light of modern needs and in the light of evils
which have developed during the time older statutes have been in operatio . Such examples as public health legislation, housing ordinances,
the codification of the criminal law, the recent codification of military
law by the armed services, and the drafting of the model post-mortem
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examinations act are relevant in this connection.2 In all of these situations there has been a body of existing legislation which frequently
has been haphazard, ill conceived, and inconsistent. It is the task of
the legislator and the legislative draftsman to bring some order out
of this chaos and to present a unified body of law which will be sufficient
to deal with modern problems as they arise.
Another topic for discussion is how to tell what impact on human
life is made by a particular statute, or what impact may be expected.
This is a question which I have no means of answering. It seems to
me that at present the impact which may be made or which may be expected on human life as a result of statutory enactments is largely conjectural because we do not have at hand the data upon which to base
an intelligent opinion. In some instances, of course, experience in other
places may be relevant, as in a situation where one state may rely upon
the experience of another in developing workmen's compensation laws.
It is also true that an intelligent consideration of experience with
analogous situations may be helpful. One wonders, for example, what
the proponents of the Eighteenth Amendment would have done if
they had considered the history of sumptuary legislation both in the
colonies and in the early states, and had realized what the fate of legislation of morals or the attempt to change habits which have been developed by a large element of the population has been. Finally, a consideration of existing evils may create a presumption that statutory
treatment may be helpful in curing the evils which exist. We know to
some extent the problems of the injured, the aged, and the destitute.
It may be that a realization of these problems will be helpful in assessing the impact which legislation designed to cure the evils may have,
but in the absence of a thorough and considered study of human behavior in the various areas within which statutes operate it would seem
that very little can be said in terms of the question posed by this aspect
of the program.
III.
STATUTE OF MINUTE DETAIL.

We now turn to a consideration of the effectiveness of statutes in

particular instances and it is suggested that we draw a distinction
between the statute of minute detail and the statute of general principle. Here again it is possible to generalize although the generalization may be invalid in specific instances. It seems quite cler that
where certainty is important and administrative discretion should be
2. See notes 5, 6, 7 and 8 infra.
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kept at a minimum the statute of minute detail has a place. Probably the clearest example of this is in the criminal law. Not only is
the constitutional requirement of definiteness and certainty present here
but also the basic postulate which is shared by most of us that no one
should be penalized criminally for doing an act as to which he was not
warned in the first place. Jeremy Bentham referred to the common
law as "dog law." a He said that when you train a dog you wait until
he does something you don't like and then beat him for it so that he
won't do it again. And the common law, particularly as it was applied
in criminal situations, he said, was like beating the dog after he had
done the act which he did not know was wrong. Certainly we do not
want the lives and liberties of people to be affected by vague statutes or
by statutes which grant broad administrative discretion to law enforcement officers.
Taxing statutes are likewise instances in which statutes of minute
detail are usually better than statutes of general principle. Mr. Justice
Holmes once said that men must turn square corners when dealing
with the government 4 and a necessary corollary of this proposition
should be that the corners be made square by statutes rather than be
rounded by the use of administrative discretion in this field.
Another instance involves certain aspects of negotiable instrument
law. Here it may be more important that there be a definite rule than
that the rule be right. The need for instruments which can in fact be
negotiated makes definite rules strictly adhered to necessary. If we
were to have general principles and administrative discretion in this
area the business of the country would be seriously handicapped.
IV.
STATUTES OF GENERAL PRINCIPLE.

Statutes of general principle involve situations exactly opposite to
those just mentioned. Where a general standard of conduct is needed
and where administrative discretion is desirable, then of course general
principles are better than minute detail. Possibly the area of unfair
trade practices might be an example. Here the concept of fairness is
important but, because of changing circumstances and conditions, it
would be virtually impossible to draft a statute which would completely and minutely describe all types of unfair trade practices which
might exist. The same thing may be true in connection with combinations in restraint of trade.' The Sherman Act is couched in very
BENTHAM, WORKS, 233 (Bowring ed. 1843).
4. Rock Island, Ark. and La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).

3. 5
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broad terms and has been given content by judicial interpretation.
Probably it would be impossible and undesirable to attempt to define
with precision all situations which might constitute combinations in
restraint of trade.
There are, in addition to these instances, borderline cases in which
it is difficult to decide what we want and where conclusions should be
based upon experience and research. For example, is it better to have
a statute which sets a speed-limit at 50 miles an hour or one which
simply indicates that the speed maintained should be reasonable Under
existing conditions? There are many arguments on both sides and I
do not pretend to have the answer. But again it involves a question as
to whether a strict rule is better from the standpoint of public safety
than the requirement of a reasonable standard which leaves considerable
administrative discretion in the hands of the law enforcement officers.
Another instance involves the making of wills. Is it more important
to follow the intention of the maker of the will, even though formalities
are not complied with, than it is to require definite formalities such as
an attestation clause and signatures by two or three witnesses? Considerations of social policy are present here and we do not, in my opinion, have sufficient information on which to base a judgment.
V.
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH.

Perhaps the most important phase of the subject under consideration is that of research in connection with legislative drafting. Such
drafting offers an opportunity for exactly the type of legal research law
students should be encouraged to do. For purposes of common law
litigation, ordinarily research consists in pawing over precedents in
the library and trying to distinguish one case from another. Although
this definitely has its value, it also limits the lawyer in the material he
knows how to use. One of the great needs of legal education is to get
research out of the stacks and into the market place. We should be
concerned not only with opinions embalmed in reports but also with live
facts. Almost any drafting problem makes it necessary to find facts
in relatively simple or relatively complicated situations. Techniques
of ascertaining these facts and putting them into appropriate statutory
language are ones which are most needed, and as to which our law
schools are perhaps most deficient.
Another advantage in legislative research is that it offers an opportunity for what we learnedly call the interdisciplinary approach.
This means that lawyers have to work with people who are experts in
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fields other than law. They may be physicians, scientists, economists,
psychologists, even psychiatrists and social workers, depending upon
the particular project in which the research is being carried on. Students and young lawyers engaged in drafting thus have an opportunity
to learn something about these other professions which will not only
enhance their knowledge but give them an increasing degree of respect
for people who are working in non-legal areas.
However, the advantages are not all on one side. People working in other disciplines can profit a great deal from the participation of
lawyers in their projects. As I have suggested elsewhere,5 "Lawyers
are experts in at least three things, apart from the substantive law. The
first is assimilating and explaining the technical knowledge of other
professions; the second is the adjustment of human relations; the third
is the use of language to convey as well as to obscure meaning." The
combination of these three qualities makes the lawyer unique in the advantages which he can offer to a drafting team. If a lawyer knows his
business and if he has the proper attitude which will enable him to
command the respect of other experts in the field he can function very
well as the quarterback of the team. He can bring together conflicting
points of view, can relate the importance of the various things discussed,
determine what should be done, and then couch the whole result in appropriate language. This is something that technical experts in other
fields often do not realize, no more than they realize the extreme tediousness and difficulty of finding language which will actually express the
meaning which they intend to convey.
At this point it might be well to speak briefly of two projects
which have been conducted at the University of Pittsburgh Law School
and which illustrate the benefits which can be derived from legislative
research and drafting. The first was a project originally under the
direction of Professor Harold Reuschlein, now the Dean of the Villanova Law School, to create a modern Public Health Code. We were
not able to use law students in this project although I think in the future
we could do so if other projects of this sort come along. But we did
use several recent graduates and we turned them loose into the whole
field of Public Health Laws of which, of course, they had had very
little knowledge. After discovering what the existing laws were, they
secured the assistance of Public Health experts and others, talked with
them at great length about what was desirable in the field of Public
Health legislation and, in collaboration with these experts, worked out
several statutes, some of which have been enacted by the Legislature of
5. Nutting, Lawyers and the Legislative Process, 54 W. VA. L. REv. 287, 295

(1952).
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the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The other project, directed by
Professor William F. Schulz, Jr., consisted of an investigation of the
laws and administrative practices relating to the conservation of renewable natural resources in Pennsylvania and culminated in the preparation of a draft of a model conservation law. Here, too, the young
assistants ranged all over the state, talking not only with government
experts on conservation but, also, with citizens who were interested in
various aspects of the problem. The result was not only a good bill but
also the preparation of a volume which deals very extensively with con6
servation practices and laws.
One could, of course, mention an almost endless number of projects
of this kind which might be undertaken, some of which are actually
being carried on now. At Pittsburgh, we have done some work on a
Model Housing Code for Municipalities. 7 I mentioned Dean Leflar's
experience in drafting the Post-Mortem Examinations Act in another
context.8 As far as codification is concerned--and here I continue
to use the word in the broad sense which I stated at first-we have
had examples of the codification of military law ' and the progressive
codification of the criminal law 10 which is now in progress. Just the
other day there was news of a proposed survey of the criminal law
of Wisconsin which undoubtedly will result in the drafting of much
legislation and which will be predicated on a very intensive investigation of what actually takes place in connection with criminal administration in that state.
There are just two points which should be mentioned here by way
of caution. The first is that projects of this kind are extremely expensive. The Pittsburgh Public Law project, for example, has cost us
in the neighborhood of $160,000. The Conservation project was considerably less expensive but it ran to at least $25,000. Substantial
financial support is necessary if an institution is to do effective work in
this field.
The next point is the matter of time. Not only is this type of work
expensive but it is also terribly time-consuming. Many, many hours
of research must be accomplished before the drafting begins. Even
after the drafting has begun, there will be countless revisions, necessitating conferences, reconsiderations of points previously thought
settled, and so on. But the results are well worth the cost-not only
6.

SCHULZ,

CONSERVATION

LAWS AND ADMINISTRATION

(1953).

7. Stahl, A Housing Code Is Drafted for Pittsburgh, 40 A.B.A.J. 63 (1954)..
8. Leflar, Drafting the Model Post-Mortem Examinations Act, 41 A.B.A.J. 267

(1955).

9. Dickerson, The Codification of Military Law,.38 .A.B.A.J. 1037 (1952).10. Hall, Codification of the Criminal Law, 38 A.B.A.J. 953 (1952).
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in terms of what the end product is, but also in terms of the educational opportunities which this type of activity affords. Law schools
are producing statutory draftsmen now more by accident than design
and if we are able to get students interested in this type of thing on a
continuing basis, and to a considerable extent, we will be accomplishing a great deal in the improvement of the law.
VI.
LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY.

A final topic has to do with getting to the voter and to the legisnature. And here this introductory point must be made. Universities
should not lobby. Not only may they get themselves in hot water but
they also may involve the charitable foundations which finance their
work in difficulty with the Internal Revenue Bureau. For some reason
or other, these foundations are a little touchy about losing their tax exemption and if it were to develop that their funds were being used in
lobbying or toward the advocacy of legislation, this might well occur.
We avoided this in Pittsburgh, first, by securing a request from the appropriate governmental officials before we undertook the projects and,'
secondly, by turning over the results, without comment, to the officials
who had requested them. This very effectively insulates both the university and its financial sponsor from any difficulties involving supposed
advocacy of legislation.
On the other hand, there is no reason why an attorney in private
practice should not present his case before the legislature on behalf of
his client. The difficult problem here is to convince the lawyer, the law
student, and perhaps even the public, that what we have come to call
legislative advocacy is respectable. I pass for the moment the question as to whether lawyers should engage in activities ordinarily known
as lobbying. This, it seems to me, depends largely on the individual
circumstance and if a lawyer does decide to engage in lobbying of this
kind he will, of course, be required to register as a professional lobbyist
where this is required by law. But legislative advocacy means a good
deal more than mere lobbying. It is a professional activity which can
be engaged in without any lowering of professional standards. Professor Julius Cohen has dealt in a very interesting manner with this problem and has pointed out the remarkable similarity between judicial and
legislative advocacy, particularly when issues such as due process may
The
be involved in legislation having to do with economic regulation.'
techniques of the constitutional lawyer are equally applicable whether
11. Cohen, Some Observations on Advocacy:

A.B.A.J. 656 (1955).

Judicial and Legislative, 41
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he is appearing before a legislative committee or before a judicial tribunal in this situation.
It surely appears that a good deal is involved in legislative advocacy as far as securing the passage of legislation is concerned. Professor Menard of the University of Colorado has recently dealt with this
problem 12 and has pointed out many things which a lawyer can appropriately do in presenting a case to a legislative committee and in
securing ultimate favorable action by the legislature itself. Not only
careful drafting but careful preparation of underlying memoranda is
necessary in this connection.
The art of legislative advocacy also extends to situations such as
Professor Kernochan has pointed out and which have to do with the
identification of critical points in the legislative process.' 3 When these
points are discovered and appropriate pressure brought to bear, the
passage of legislation is considerably easier than would otherwise be
the case.
These rather rambling comments may do little but illustrate a conviction that research for legislation offers one of the most fascinating
and fruitful opportunities for the law teacher, the law student, and the
lawyer. It is an area which has hitherto been neglected but which deserves all the support we can give it. There are so many things which
need to be done and which involve research of this type that one could
spend hours simply outlining the topics. For example, what might
result from an interdisciplinary research project which would deal with
the question, "What does the welfare state do to the spirit of man?"
The question may be loaded but what a fascinating study this would be
and what effect might it have on the passage or amendment of social
security legislation!
12. Menard, Proving a Case to the Legislature, 41 A.B.A.J. 860 (1955).
13. Kernochan, Congressional Processes: Critical Points and Individual "Pressure", 37 A.B.A.J. 848 (1951).
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